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CURRENT LEGISLATION
COMMUNISM

AND

THE CONSTITUTION-INTERNAL

SECURITY ACT

OF 19501

From the moment of its inception the United States has been
afforded by the Constitution means of preserving and perpetuating

its existence. 2 Responding to this grant of authority, Congress has
periodically legislated to safeguard the nation from internal disintegration as well as from external encroachment.
At the time of the passage of the Internal Security Act there
were on the statute books many pieces of legislation which had for
their purpose the maintenance of internal order.3 Treason,4 espionage,5 and sabotage 6 had been made crimes. These offenses were
legislated against to punish the instrumentalities of foreign nations
whose activities were somewhat of a military character. To supplement these penal sanctions legislation was enacted to deter those who
7
would interfere with national self-protection in more subtle ways.
Congress, having deemed it inadequate merely to punish inimical
conduct, took preventive measures to ferret out and identify persons
who as agents of foreign nations were potentially dangerous to the
' Pub. L. No. 831, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 23, 1950). This article
does not purport to treat every aspect of this rather extensive piece of legislation, but only those which seem to be of a more controversial character.
2U. S. CONST. Art. III, §3(1) provides:
"Treason against the United
States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or, in adhering to their
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort"
U. S. Cozisr. Art. I, § 8(15) provides that Congress shall have the power
to ". . . provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions."
3 Prof. Zechariah Chafee of Harvard in expressing his opposition to S.
2311 (the Senate version of the Internal Security Act before its adoption)
commented that he saw no need for additional legislation in view of the many
existing sedition statutes. Hearings before the Committee on Un-American
Activities on H. R. 3903 and H. R. 7595, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2319-21 (1950).
4 18 U. S. C. § 2381 (1948) provided the criminal penalty for the offense
of treason in Article 3, Section 3, of the United States Constitution.
r18 U. S. C. §§791-97 (1948).
618 U. S. C. §§2151-56 (1948).
7 18 U. S. C. §§ 2387-88 (1948).
Thus it was made a crime to undermine the morale of the United States Armed Forces. To secure a conviction
under Section 2388 for attempting to cause insubordination in the Armed Forces,
it is not necessary to show that insubordination actually occurred. United
States v. Krafft, 249 Fed. 919 (3d Cir. 1918).
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security of the country.8 Finally, with the realization that there
was a growing body of highly militant people within the country
who were basically antagonistic to our constitutional form of government, it was made a crime to advocate or teach the necessity or
propriety of forcefully overthrowing the government.9 Onto this
corpus of existing law the Internal Security Act was engrafted. The
addition was made because Congress believed that the Communist
Party had avoided, and could continue to avoid, successful prosecution under existing law by resorting to secret, conspiratorial
methods. 10
II
Implicit in every legislative attempt to regulate conduct in the
best interest of the nation at large is the danger of infringing on the
constitutional rights of individuals.'1 This problem is particularly
acute in the field of security legislation because of the grave possibility of violating individual rights of free speech and assembly."2
Of course, it has been long recognized that these rights are not
absolute. A statute which prohibited the use on city streets of a
sound truck which broadcasts loud noises to the disturbance of others
has been held valid.' 8 Also, a regulation requiring a group to obtain
a license before conducting a parade on a public thoroughfare has
been held constitutional.1 4 Such limitations as these have been imposed for the promotion of community safety, morals, and convenience. The need for such regulations is easily perceived; objection,
therefore, is not strong because of the obvious necessity of harmonizing the diverse and conflicting interests in a complex social
mechanism.
However, in the field of security legislation the problems are
not so concrete and evident. The American people have long enjoyed
an almost unhampered freedom in the exchange of all sorts of political notions. Any attempt by legislation to curtail or channel the
s52 STAT. 631-33 (1938), as amended, 22 U. S. C. §§611-21 (1946)
(McCormack Act). The act required the agents of a foreign government to
register with the Attorney General and to label their propaganda. For proceedings under the statute, see Viereck v. United States, 139 F. 2d 847 (D. C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 794 (1944). See also 18 U. S. C. § 2386 (1948)
(Voorhis Act of 1940 which required the registration of native groups that
participated in military drill).
9 18 U. S. C. § 2385 (1948). This act is popularly referred to as the
Smith Act of 1940. Under it were recently convicted eleven leaders of the
Communist Party. United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
1°H. R. REP. No. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
1x United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
.12U.S. CoxsT. AMEN. I: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble. .. ."
1" Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). But cf. Saia v. New York, 334
U. S. 558 (1948).
24 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941).
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flow of this political activity is not so readily accepted as is, for
example, legislation penalizing the sale of obscene literature.j 5
Faced with this problem in the case of Schenck v. United States,'8
Mr. Justice Holmes laid down a rule which has become known as
the clear and present danger principle, as an aid in tipping the delicately balanced scales between national security and individual freedom. There he said: "The question in every case is whether the
words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 17 This decision
attempted to establish a judicial rule which would secure to the individual the greatest measure of freedom consistent with national
self-preservation.
The rule as asserted by Holmes has been adopted in several subsequent decisions, 18 but has not been established as the exclusive
test.' 9 Thus, in Gitlow v. New York 20 the Court adopted a broader
concept in determining how far a statute might go in qualifying
freedom of speech. The test therein applied was the reasonable tendency that the conduct or speech would have in producing the illegal
result.21 Additionally, it has been held that proof of a criminal pur15 It is not suggested that there are different legal criteria in the two fields
for determining the constitutionality of a given statute; it is merely submitted
that legislation in the field of political speech presents a more complex and
difficult problem.
16249 U. S. 47 (1919) (the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the
defendant for conspiring to obstruct recruiting in violation of the Espionage
Act of 1917).
17 Id. at 52.
Is Hartzel v. United States, 322 U. S. 680 (1944); Bridges v. California,
314 U. S. 252 (1941) (reversed the conviction of the defendant for having
criticized a decision of a state court while a motion for a new trial was pending).

Justice Black said:

"....

the substantive evil must be extremely serious ...

before utterances can be punished." Id. at 263.
19 The rule was not followed in Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466
(1920) (Holmes dissenting), nor was it adopted in Abrams v. United States,
250 U. S. 616 (1919).
20263 U. S. 652 (1925).
21 Mr. Justice Sanford said:
"The ,State cannot reasonably be required
to measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a
jeweler's scale. A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It
cannot be said that the State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the
exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public
peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has
enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be
required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until
the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace
or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the
exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency."
Id. at 669. Also see Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945)
(defendant made publications in violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act);
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920) (conviction sustained under a state
statute making it unlawful to obstruct recruiting).
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pose, without proof22 of a clear and present danger, is sufficient to
warrant conviction.
These decisions cast some doubt on the part the principle will
play in freedom of speech cases. Graver doubt is cast on its use in
by reason of the Supreme
cases concerned with freedom of assembly
2
Court's consistent failure to apply it. 3
Doubt concerning the applicability of the clear and present danger principle persists to the present. A recent decision has made
strong reference to it in a case involving a speech by an individual.24
But there is strong indication to the effect that the principle will not
application in cases involving conspiracy and subreceive a literal 25
versive activities.
Notwithstanding the unlikely application of the principle, Congress has declared that the Communist Party does in fact present
a clear and present danger.26 This declaration was made after many
painstaking and exhaustive studies. It was made no doubt because
of Congress' consciousness that the Supreme Court does not regard
lightly its duty to preserve constitutional guarantees and hence requires impelling reasons for upholding any infringement on them.
The significance of this legislative declaration will be considered
as the various provisions of the Act are severally discussed.
III
Sedition
The newly enacted sedition provision of the Act is Section 4-a
which makes it unlawful for any person knowingly to combine, conspire, or agree with any other person to do any act which would
substantially contribute to the establishment of a foreign-controlled
dictatorship in the United States.27 The legislative finding that the
22 Commonwealth v. Lazar, 103 Pa. Super. 417, 157 Atl. 701 (1931), appeal
dismissed, 286 U. S. 532 (1932).
28

Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941); Hague v. Committee for

Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496 (1939) ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S.
353 (1937) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931).
24 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949).
25 United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). The clear and
present danger doctrine does not require that the nation await the moment be-

fore protecting itself ". . . when we may be so far extended by foreign engagements, so far divided in counsel, or so far in industrial or financial straits,
that the chance seems worth trying. That position presupposes that the Amendment assures them freedom for all preparatory steps and in 'the end the choice
of initiative, dependent upon that moment when they believe us, who must await
the blow, to be worst prepared to receive it." Id. at 213. See American Communications Commission v. Douds, 339 U. S.382, 394 (1950).
26After recounting the history and methods of the Communist Party in
Section 2(1-:15) of the Internal Security Act Congress declares in Section
2(15): "The Communist organization in the United States ...presentts]
a clear and present danger to the security of the United States. .. "
AcT §3(15) defines a totalitarian dictatorship as a
27 INTRNAL SEcuT
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Communist Party presents a clear and present danger does not have
the effect of making this section applicable to mere membership in
the party since the Act expressly provides that membership in any
Communist organization is not a violation of the provision.2 8 The
prosecution would have to show that the conduct of the individual
defendant tended to produce the illegal result.

While it has been suggested that the government need not wait
until the last possible moment to arrest conduct which is calculated
to result in its downfall, 29 it was not meant that the government
could pass legislation which would have the result of
30 depriving an
individual of his rights under the First Amendment.
On first impression it would appear that Section 4-a would effectively stifle free political activity in a rather broad area. If there
were no limitation placed on its application it would probably fall
as constitutionally defective. Congress, however, cognizant of this
problem, placed a general limitation on the construction of the entire
Act, namely, that no provision be construed to infringe on freedom of
the press or speech. 31 Further indication that the statute is not
directed essentially against free speech may be drawn from an examination of the terminology of the section and the legislative intent.
The words "combine, conspire, or agree with any other person
to do any act" hardly seem to be directed against open or public
discussion of ideas but rather against covert machinations to undermine the existing system of government.3 2 The Congress has even
provided that the statute shall not prohibit efforts to establish
a
33
foreign-controlled dictatorship by constitutional amendment.
Congress in studying the need for this legislation clearly recognized a distinction between Communism "as an economic, social and
political theory" and "as a secret conspiracy, dedicated to subverting
the interests of the United States to that of a foreign dictatorship." 34
system of government

". . . not representative in fact, characterized by (A) the
existence of a single political party, organized on a dictatorial basis, with so
close an identity between such party and its policies and the governmental
policies of the country in which it exists that the party and the government
constitute an indistinguishable unit, and (B) the forcible suppression of opposition to such party."

2811d. §4(f).
20 See discussion under Section II, text, supra.
30

See note 12 supra.

SEcuarrY ACT § 1 (b).
32 IN=N.L SEcuiurv ACT § 4(a) provides:
31 INTMNAL

"It shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly to combine, conspire, or agree with any other person to
perform any act which would substantially contribute to the establishment within the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship . . .the direction and control of which is to be vested in, or exercised by or under the domination or
control of, any foreign government, foreign organization, or foreign individual:
Provided, however, that this subsection shall not apply to the proposal of a
constitutional Amendment."
33 Ibid.

34 H. R. REP. No. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
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All these molding factors militate against the section's receiving
a construction that would doom it under the First Amendment.
Although the courts have upheld statutes outlawing conspiracy,35
they have been careful to deny validity to statutes which fail to make
an adequate distinction between lawful and unlawful conduct.3 6 Thus,
if the section can be construed to penalize acts which are inherently

innocent, it would seem it must fall on constitutional grounds.3 7
However, the above-mentioned qualifications ought to spare it from
such a fate. With this qualification on its application, the question
arises whether the sfatute notifies the public as to what conduct is
prohibited.
In enacting penal statutes the legislature always faces the task
of making the provision broad enough to encompass all the sundry
forms that the prohibited conduct might take without making it so
broad that it might be deemed vague and hence violative of the essential requirement of due process.38
To determine whether the
legislature has met the requirements of due process the test is whether
reasonable men are advised by the statute of the nature of the conduct
proscribed. 9 A standard of guilt must be established by the legislature and cannot be left to the determination of a court or jury.
In enacting a statute the legislature is not constrained to use
only legal or technical terminology, but may adopt terms of common
usage and understanding. 40 Thus a number of statutes have been
upheld which established illegal conduct in well defined and understood terms of business usage. 41 However, where the terms used
impose upon the defendant the task of estimating the legality of his
conduct by evaluating numerous fluctuating intangibles,
the statute
4
has been held vague and violative of due process.

35 Dunne v. United States, 138 F. 2d 137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. S.
790 (1943); State v. Gilbert, 141 Minn. 263, 169 N. W. 790, affd, 254 U. S.
325 3 (1920); People v. Most, 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175 (1902).
6Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135 (1945); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U. S.353 (1937); Stromberg v. California 283 U. S. 359 (1931); State v.
Diamond, 22 N. M. 477, 202 Pac. 988 (1921).
37 Stromberg v. California, supra note 36 ('red flag" statute invalidated
for penalizing peaceful opposition to government).
38 For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Justice Frankfurter's
dissenting opinion in Winters v. New York, 333 U. S.507, 525 (1948).
39 United States v. Gbrin, 312 U. S. 19 (1941); United States v. Reese,
92 U. S. 214 (1875); United States v. Foote, 42 F. Supp. 717 (D. C. Del.
1942); State v. Magaha, 182 Md. 722. 32 A. 2d 477 (1943).
40 Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S.374 (1932).
41 United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S.77 (1932)
(regulations against misbranding of products); Hygrade Provision Co. v.
Sherman, 266 U. S. 497 (1925) (regulation against fraudulently representing
meat to be "kosher"); Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913) (antitrust law); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S.86 (1909) (anti-trust
law)42 ; Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905) (anti-trust law).
United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S.81 (1921) (statute forbade the making of "any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling
or dealing with any necessaries") ; Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U. S.634 (1914)
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Illustrations of this same method of reasoning may be found in3
areas other than business regulation. In United States v. Petrillo4
the Supreme Court considered a statute prohibiting any person from
coercing a radio broadcaster to hire more employees than he needed.
The Court held that the statute was not too vague, for it provided a
concrete factual basis for determining the legality of conduct. Conversely, the Court in Winters v. New York 44 struck down on .the
ground of vagueness a statute prohibiting the distribution of reading
matter containing stories of crime which would incite depraved crimes
against the person. The New York Court of Appeals had previously
construed the statute to mean the distribution of stories ". . . so
massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes
against the person . . . . 4 However, the nation's highest Court
felt that it was too nebulous a test to require a person under the pain
of criminal liability to determine whether the material he had assembled was so arranged as to cause the undesirable result.
While it is true that a statute must establish a standard of guilt,
that standard need not be so specific where the statute requires that
the conduct be knowingly done,46 for it is presumed that the accused
47
intended the reasonable and probable consequences of his conduct.
Since Section 4-a requires that the forbidden conspiracy be knowingly
entered, it would seem that an accused cannot complain, if convicted,
on the ground that he was not aware that his conduct was unlawful.48
Where the statute has established some standard, it is not a defense
that the accused has mistaken the character of his conduct for, as
Mr. Justice Holmes has said: "... the law is full of instances where
a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury
subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree." 49
If, as has been previously indicated, Section 4-a is limited to
the punishment of conspiracies aimed only at the forceful disestablishment of the existing government, the use of the terms "substantially
contributing" should have ample meaning to those who approach a
breach of the section.

(statute forbade merchants from withdrawing from selling pool to sell products at less than "real" value).
43 332 U. S. 1 (1947).
44 333 U. S.507 (1947).
45 People v. Winters, 294 N. Y. 545, 550, 63 N. E. 2d 98, 100 (1945).

46

Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945); Gorin v. United States,

312 U. S. 19

(1941).
47 Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.

S. 14, rehearing denied, 329 U. S. 830
(1946) ; United States v. Betteridge, 43 F. Supp. 53 (N. D. Ohio 1942).
48 "A mind interit upon willful evasion is inconsistent with surprised innocence." United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 524 (1942).
49 Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 377 (1913).
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IV
Registration
In addition to the sedition provisions an attempt is made in the
Act to bring to the surface those elements of our society which are
regarded as inherently inimical to the existing form of government.
To accomplish this Congress provided for the registration of Communist action 50 and front organizations. 1 Organizations defined

by the law were to register within thirty days of its enactment, within
thirty days after becoming an organization within the meaning of the
statute, or within thirty days after a final order of the Subversive
Activities Control Board requiring the organization to register had
been issued.52 The registration statement as prepared by the Attorney General must include the name of the organization, the address
of its principal office, 53 the names and addresses of the officers of
such organizations, 4 and an accounting of the monies received and
expended by the organization. 55 Further, the names and addresses

of each individual member of a Communist action organization must

be furnished in the statement. 56 These requirements must be met
annually
so that the Attorney General's records may be kept up to
57
date.

An individual burden is placed on the member of a Communist
action organization to register himself in the event that the organi-

zation to which he belongs fails to register, 5 8 or he knows that,
although it did register, it failed to include his name on its membership list.59 Severe penalties are imposed on those organizations and
individuals who fail to comply with the registration requirements.60
Considered as classification for legislative purposes the registration provisions of the Internal Security Act are by no means an innovation in American legal history. Classification has been adopted
as a means of attaining a legislative goal in many diversified fields
50 INTERNAL SECURiTY

AcT § 7(a).

tion organization as one which is ".

Section 3(3) defines a Communist ac.

. substantially directed, dominated, or

controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the
world Communist movement. . "
5-Id. § 7(b). Section 3(4) defines a Communist front organization as one
. . . which (A) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by a
Communist-action organization, and (B) is primarily operated for the purpose
of giving aid and support -to a Communist-action organization, a Communist
foreign
government, or the world Communist movement ..
52
Id. § 7(c).
53 Id. j 7(d)
54
55

56

(1).

Id.§ 7(d) (2).
Id.

§ 7(d) (3).

Id. § 7(d) (4).
57 Id. § 7 (e).
58
Id. §8(a).
59 Id. § 8Jb).
60 Id. .§ 15
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such as taxation,6' regulation of coal mine operations, 62 maintaining
standards of physicians, 63 regulation of resale price of trademarked
products, 64 and traffic control.65
Any such classification, however, must not be arbitrary, but must
be reasonable and proper with respect to the purpose of the legislation; 61 otherwise it will be invalidated as in conflict with the constitutional requirement of equal protection.67 The courts in reviewing
a classification do not inquire into its wisdom, but seek only to discover if there is a reasonable basis for it.6s The case of Bryant v.
Zimmerman 69 is a leading precedent for classification by registration.
There the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute requiring
members of secret organizations, particularly the Ku Klux Klan, to
register. The statute was enacted primarily to impede those individuals who engaged in activities disruptive of public order, namely,
the harassment of certain racial and religious groups. The purpose
of the statute was no doubt socially legitimate and the Court found
that the means adopted-registration-was not unreasonable to attain its objective.
There is little doubt that it is a legitimate function of Congress
to legislate for the preservation of the nation. The means adopted
by Congress-classification and registrationare based on the
legislative finding of the existence of a dangerous subversive movement within the country. 70 Although the courts are not bound by
this finding,71 they will probably give much weight to it.j 2 So, unless
the court is firmly persuaded that classification by registration is
absolutely arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation to securing the
desired end, it will uphold the registration provisions in the face of
an attack on the ground of classification.7"
61 State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931);
Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509 (1931).
62 Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26 (1913).
'3
64

Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173 (1910).

Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram's Distiller's Corp., 299 U. S.
183 (1936).
6(5Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374 (1932).
06 Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207 (1945) ; People v. Gidaly,
35 Cal. App. 2d 758, 93 P. 2d 660 (1939); Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil,
363 I1. 559, 2 N. E. 2d 929, aff'd, 299 U. S. 183 (1936).
67 Although there is no federal equal protection clause, the Fifth Amendment requires equal application of the law in the absence of reasonable grounds
for inequality.
68 Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251 (1936) ; McLean
v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539 (1909).
69278 U. S. 63 (1928).
70 INTrNAL Szcurrv AcT § 2; H. R. REP. No. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.

1-2 (1950).

71 Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1 (1929).
2 Sage Stores v. Kansas, 323 U. S. 32 (1944); Mulford v. Smith, 307
U. S. 38 (1939); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
73 See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 (D. C. Cir.), cert. granted, 339
U. S. 977 (1950) (constitutionality of Presidential Loyalty Order, Exec. Order
No. 9835, upheld).
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What are the organizations and who are the individuals required
to register? In the event that those required to register fail to do
so voluntarily, elaborate machinery begins to operate to force registration. There has been established a Subversive Activities Control
Board,7 4 which determines upon the application of the Attorney
General whether an organization or individual is required to register.7 5 Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that
an organization is of the type that must register, he petitions the
Board for an order requiring it to register. 76 Upon receipt of the
petition the Board is entitled to receive evidence and issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses.7 7 All hearings before
78
the Board are public.

Provision is made for a default order in a

case where an organization or individual fails to appear. 79

After

evaluating the evidence at the hearing the Board makes a report in
writing stating the findings of fact and either issues an order requiring the organization or individual to register8 0 or denies the Attorney
General's petition. 8 ' Provision is made for appeal to the- United
States Court of Appeals by anyone who is aggrieved by an order of
the Board 8 2 The orders of the Board become final upon the expiration of the time fixed for appeal or upon the affirmance of the
83
Board's order by the court.
The most perplexing problem facing the Board is that of the
evidence to be used by it in determining what organization is to be
required to register. Congress has provided certain criteria to be
used by the Board in ascertaining whether an organization is a Communist action 8 4 or Communist front 8 5 organization.
74

INTERNAL SECURITY

ACT § 12(a). The Subversive Activities Control

Board will hereinafter be referred to as the Board.
75 INTERNAL ScuCrrY ACT § 12(e).
76

Id. § 13(a).

Section 13(b) provides for a petition by one required to reg-

ister for cancellation of such order.
77 INTERNAL SECURITY ACT § 13(c).

78 Id. § 13 (d) (1).
79 Id. § 13 (d) (2).
so Id.§ 13 (g).
81 Id.§ 13(h).
82 Id. § 14(a).
83
Id.§ 14(b).
8

4INTERNAL SECURITY ACT § 13(e) provides: "In determining whether any
organization is a 'Communist-action organization,' the Board shall take into
consideration-(1) the extent to which its policies are formulated and carried
out and its activities performed, pursuant to directives or to effectuate the
policies of the foreign government or foreign organization in which is vested,
or under the domination or control of which is exercised, the direction and
control of the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this
title; and (2) the extent to which its views and policies do not deviate from
those of such foreign government or foreign organization; and (3) the extent
to which it receives financial or other aid, directly or indirectly, from or at
the direction of such foreign government or foreign organization; and (4) the
extent to which it sends members or representatives to any foreign country
for instruction or training in the principles, policies, strategy, or tactics of
such world Communist movement; and (5) the extent to which it reports to
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It is not extraordinary for the legislature to prescribe the kind
and type of evidence to be received before various tribunals.8 6 However, it is necessary that there be some rational relationship between
the evidence introduced and the ultimate fact to be proved. 7 There
appears to be little reason for believing that
88 the courts will find arbitrary the clastification made by Congress.
Nevertheless, the question of the quantity and quality of evidence
that must be adduced before an organization can be pronounced Communistic is a practical one. It is nowhere specifically stated in the
enumeration of criteria that all the criteria must be alluded to in
determining the character of an organization, but it is to be noted
that the important conjunction "and" joins each criterion to the
other in the series.8 9 Construing the presence of the conjunction to
mean that the Board must consider each criterion, it is still not required that the Board find the presence of each characteristic before
such foreign government or foreign organization or to its representatives; and
(6) the extent to which its principal leaders or a substantial number of its
members are subject to or recognize the disciplinary power of such foreign
government or foreign organization or its representatives; and (7) the extent
to which, for the purpose of concealing foreign direction, domination, or control, or of expediting or promoting its objectives, (i) it fails to disclose, or
resists efforts to obtain information as to, its membership (by keeping membership lists in code, by instructing members to refuse to acknowledge membership, or by any other method) ; (ii) its members refuse to acknowledge membership therein; (iii) it fails to disclose, or resists efforts to obtain information
as to, records other than membership lists; (iv) its meetings are secret; and
v) it otherwise operates on a secret basis; and (8) the extent to which its
principal leaders or a substantial number of its members consider the allegiance
they owe to the United States as subordinate to their obligations to such foreign8 government or foreign organization."
r INTM.NAL SECURITY Acr § 13(f) provides: "In determining whether any
organization is a 'Communist-front organization,' the Board shall take into consideration-(l) the extent to which persons who are active in its management,
direction, or supervision, whether or not holding office therein are active in
the management, direction, or supervision of, or as representatives of, any
Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or the world
Communist movement referred to in section 2; and (2) the extent to which
its support, financial or otherwise, is derived from any Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or the world Communist movement
referred to in section 2; and (3) the extent to which its funds, resources or
personnel are used to further or promote the objectives of any Communistaction organization, Communist foreign government, or the world Communist
movement referred to in section 2; and (4) the extent to which the positions
taken or advanced by it from time to time on matters of policy do not deviate
from those of any Communist-action organization, Communist foreign government, or the world Communist movement referred to in section 2."
86 "The rules of evidence, however, are established not alone by the courts
but by the legislature. The Congress has power to prescribe what evidence
is to be received in the courts of the United States." Tot v. United States,
319 U. S. 463, 467 (1943).
87 Tot v. United States, supra note 86; Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1
(1929).
8 See note 70 .mpra.
89 See notes 84 and 85 stpra.
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ordering an organization to register. Indeed, it is theoretically possible for the Board to issue such an order on finding the presence of
but one characteristic. Such a possibility is somewhat objectionable,
particularly where one of the criterion is the extent to which the
organization under review does not deviate from the Communist
"line."
Many organizations would be reluctant to take a stand on any
political issue for fear of finding themselves in agreement with the
Communists. In this regard there would be a grave possibility of
finding a "prior restraint." 90 Although the general rule of construction contained in the Act that no provision be construed to infringe
on free speech might save the registration provisions from this objection, 91 it is suggested that an express provision that no organization be required to register unless the preponderance of evidence
indicates its Communistic character would better dispel the objection
of "prior restraint." Organizations could then speak freely with less
likelihood of their being wrongly pronounced Communistic.
V
Registration of Individuals
An individual who is a member of a Communist action organization is required to register in two given situations: (1) where the
organization of which he is a member has failed to register, or (2)
where he knows that, although the organization has registered, it
has failed to record him as one of its members. 9 2 By this provision
an individual must publicly identify himself with a subversive group.
The Supreme Court recently, in Blan v. United States,93 upheld a
witness before a federal grand jury in her refusal, on the ground of
self-incrimination, 94 to answer certain questions that would associate
her with the Communist Party.9 5 The Court believed that as long
90 See Thomas v. Collins. 323 U. S. 516 (1944); Cantwell v. Connecticut,

310 U. S.296 (1940).

91INTERNAL SECURiTY AcT § 1(b).
92Id. §8.

Is95 L. Ed. 175 (Adv. Ops. 1950).
94 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V provides:
"No person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ..."
11 The questions addressed to the petitioner were: "Mrs. Blau, do you
know the names of the State officers of the Communist Party of Colorado?"
"Do you know what the organization of the Communist Party of Colorado is,
the table of organization of the Communist Party of Colorado?" "Were you
ever employed by the Communist Party of Colorado?" "Did you ever have
in your possession or custody any of the books and records of the Communist
Party of Colorado?"
"Did you turn the books and records of the Communist Party of Colorado over to any particular person?" "Do you know the
names of any persons who might now have the books and records of the
Communist Party of Colorado?" "Could you describe to the grand jury any
books and records of the Communist Party of Colorado?" (Court's footnote

No. 1.)
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as the Smith Act Il sought to punish persons who knowingly taught
or advocated the forceful overthrow of the government, or who organized or helped to organize any group which taught or advocated
such overthrow of the government, or who joined such an organization with knowledge of its purposes, the prosecution of the petitioner was more than a "mere imaginary possibility." The Court
also said that it was immaterial that the responses to the questions
would not have supported a conviction under a criminal statute; to
excuse the petitioner it was only necessary that the answers "...
would have furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a
prosecution of petitioner
for violation of (or conspiracy to violate)
97
the Smith Act."
Unlike the petitioner's situation in the Blau case a registrant
under the Internal Security Act is afforded some protection against
the consequences of his registration in that the fact of his registration
may not be received in evidence against him in a criminal prosecution.98 A witness may be relieved of his constitutional privilege to
remain silent in the face of incriminating questions and forced under
penalty of contempt to answer those questions, provided he is granted
an immunity from the consequences of answering coextensive with
his constitutional right.9 9 Thus a statute which merely provided
that testimony given shall not be introduced against the witness in
a subsequent criminal, proceeding was held to be inadequate on the
ground that the testimony solicited could be used to uncover other
evidence against him.1°9 The courts, however, have upheld statutes
which completely immunize the testifier against any prosecution growing out of the information he might be compelled to give.1 0'
Since the Blau case has specifically held that one need not
answer questions which would possibly lead to the uncovering of
other evidence that may be used to prosecute him under the Smith
Act, it would seem that the registration provisions must offer a similar safeguard to those individuals required to register.
To afford this protection the immunity clause of the Internal
Security Act should be extended to save a registrant from prosecution for crimes under the Smith Act that might be established as a
result of his registration. This immunity need not extend to all
possible crimes under the Smith Act but only to those for which a
prosecution presents a substantial, and not fanciful or remote danger
96
9 18 U. S. C. §2385 (1948).
7Blau v. United States, 95 L. Ed. 175, 176 (Adv. Ops. 1950).
9
8 INTER'AL S-cuRiTr
AcT § 4(f).
99

Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139 (1911); cf. Counselman v.
Hitchcock,
142 U. S. 547 (1892).
00

Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S.7 (1920); In re Nachman, 114 Fed.
995 (D.C. S. C. 1902); In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291 N. W. 652 (1940).
Contra: United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. 670, No. 16, 717 (S.D. Ohio
1872).

201 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S.43 (1906) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S.591

(1896).
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to the registrant. 10 2 Although the Court in the Blau case refers
only generally to the Smith Act, it is submitted that, because of the
tenor of the questions put to the petitioner, 03 which were aimed at
establishing the petitioner's affiliation with the Communist Party
and knowledge of its internal affairs, the Court in effect held that the
petitioner by answering the questions would have provided a link
in the chain of evidence necessary to prosecute her for the crimes
of organizing a subversive group or joining one that had for its
purpose the forceful overthrow of the government. The Court did
not necessarily hold that the same answers provided a link which
would have led to her prosecution for the crime of personally teaching
or advocating the need or propriety of forcefully overthrowing the
government. This is so, because the type of evidence necessary for
prosecution under the latter crime is different in that it must show
actual espousal of subversive ideas and not mere adherence to a subversive group. 10 4 The connection between petitioner's answers and
a prosecution for this latter crime is more remote and does not
present a real danger. At least, the Court did not have to find that
it did for a successful disposition of the case.
Hence, it is submitted that the immunity provision of the Internal
Security Act, in order to meet the constitutional test, be broadened
so as to prohibit prosecution of any registrant for the crimes (under
the Smith Act) of organizing or joining a group which has for its
purpose the forceful overthrow of government. It is further submitted that if the Blau case is limited in its application to these crimes,
it is not necessary to provide that a registrant not be prosecuted for
the crime of personally advocating the overthrow of government.
Even if the Blau case were construed to have application to the
crime of personally teaching or advocating the desirability of forcefully overthrowing the government, still it is submitted that mere registration does not put the registrant in anything but a remote danger
of prosecution for such crime. The registrant will merely admit
membership in a Communist action organization. This information
could lead to an investigation of his connection with it, whether he
organized it, and under what conditions he joined it. Then if its
purposes are found to be illegal he stands in the danger of prosecution
for organizing or joining a subversive group. But the admission
of membership will lead only in a remote way to prosecution for
personally teaching or advocating the need for forcefully overthrowing
the government, for the evidence necessary must pinpoint his very
act of so teaching or advocating. His membership in a subversive
group does not constitute the crime; it only indirectly and remotely
provides evidence of his political disposition. It does not without
fail lead to evidence that he at a particular time and place taught
102 See Mason
Weinberg, 65 F.
103 See note 95
104 See United

v. United States, 244 U. S. 362 (1917); United States v.

2d 394 (2d Cir. 1933).

supra.
States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
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subversive doctrine. More specific evidence is needed to prove that;
and such evidence is not always so closely connected with membership in a subversive organization that the danger to registrants can
be considered imminent. At least, the danger cannot be deemed so
imminent as to condemn the entire system of registration.
VI
Consequences of Registration
The consequences of registration are several. They affect both
the organizations required to register and the individual members
of those organizations.
Organizations required to register are denied certain tax exemptions' 05 and are required to "label" their propaganda. 0 6 The
labelling provision makes it unlawful for any organization registered
or required to register to send through the United States mail or
through any means of interstate or foreign commerce any publication
unless it is clearly identified as originating with a Communist organization, or to broadcast over radio or television without similarly
identifying the source of the material.
It was early decided that Congress had the authority to exclude certain matter from the United States mails. 10 7 This authority
was said to rest on the proprietary character of the government's
interest in the mail service in cases where the matter could be excluded by a legitimate exercise of the police power. 08 Soon the
same reasoning was extended to cases involving matter of an intellectual or political nature. 09 Congress has had a similar power to
exclude from other channels of interstate or foreign commerce matter which was regarded as being productive of harmful results."-0
All of these cases have involved discrimination against the material itself in that certain conditions were placed upon its passage.
The Internal Security Act does not go so far; it merely requires
identification of the author. This condition, of course, is imposed to
make the public aware of the sponsor of the ideas contained in a
given publication. To the extent that identification may dissuade
105 INTERNAL SEcuRITY

10 01d. § 10.

AcT

§ 11(b).

1o EX parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877).
108 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288 (1913); Public Clearing
House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904).
10oUnited States ex reL. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U. S. 407 (1921) (newspaper articles denouncing United States'
participation in war) ; Burleson v. United States ex re. Workingmen's Co-op.
Pub. Association, 274 Fed. 749 (D. C. Cir. 1921) (newspaper advocated overthrow of government by arson, murder, and assassination); Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (2d Cir. 1917) (articles urged defiance of
conscription laws).
ll9United States v. Handler, 142 F. 2d 351, cert. denied, 323 U. S. 741

(1944).
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the public from subscribing to literature authored by Communist
organizations it may be condemned by some as an infringement on
the rights of free speech. But this can hardly be considered an infringement within the meaning of the Constitution, for that document
does not guarantee a speaker an audience, but only the right to utter
his words. Under the provisions of the Act an organization is not
limited in the expression of its ideas; it is only required to identify
those ideas.
The consequences of the registration of an organization on an
individual member are twofold: he is required to divulge his membership in such organization if he is seeking or holding a federal
1
non-elective post,:
and further, he is forbidden to apply for or use
2
a passport."
These provisions will quite likely be subject to attack as "bills
of attainder" in that the legislature is singling out individuals, or
an ascertainable group of individuals, for punishment without judicial
trial.1 8 Legislative attempts to punish have been repeatedly denounced as unconstitutional " 4 since the legislature is confined to
the task of formulating the law and may not enforce it. Since the
prohibitions against the individuals are legislatively enacted, they
must be examined to determine if they constitute a form of punishment.
The requirement that members of Communist organizations
divulge their membership in seeking or holding a federal job," 5
admittedly, will much diminish their employment opportunities, for
the obvious purpose of the section is to exclude from government
employment those regarded as security risks.
Recently, the case of United States v. Lovett" 6 struck down
as unconstitutional a statute which provided that no federal funds
be payable to certain individuals. The statute was passed to effectuate the dismissal of several federal employees over the continuous objection of their executive superiors. The Supreme Court
held that the statute was an attempt at legislative punishment. By
so ruling the Court recognized that discharge from federal employment could be a form of punishment.
However, the decision is not to be read as depriving Congress of
the right to establish certain conditions for employment with the
government. The government has the right to be selective in the
employees it engages," 7 even to the extent of requiring them not
.1 INTERNAL SEcURiTy ACT § 5(a).
Id. § 6(a).
113
See United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
14
. Duncan v. Kahanomoku, 327 U. S. 304 (1946); Ex parte Garland, 71
U. S. 333, 366 (1867).
'1 INTERNAL SwCuRIY ACT § 5(a).
112

116328 U. S. 303 (1946).
117 Heim v. McCall, 239 U.

S. 175 (1915).
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to engage in political activities." 8 Nor does one have a vested right
in a government job, since he may be subjected to certain conditions
both in seeking and retaining the employment' 9
Since the government does have the right to establish conditions
for the securing or retaining of employment with it, it seems that its
exercise of such right in the interests of its own security should
hardly20 be deemed punishment within the meaning of the Lovett
case.'
It is further provided that a member of a Communist organization may not procure or use a passport. 121 . The purpose of this
enactment is to disrupt the Communist system of international communication and to prevent the American passport from becoming a
mere tool in the hands of Communists. 122 The regulation of foreign
travel has long been regarded as a sovereign function. 123 It has
been previously recognized as such by the United States in the passage of the War Service Passport Act of 1918.124
For the most part, the Secretary of State has the sole discretion
concerning the issuance of passports. 125 The exercise of this discretion is not ordinarily subject to judicial attack. But where an
refused to grant a passport his decision may
officer has arbitrarily
26
be overturned.
Since the courts have recognized a wide range of governmental
discretion in this matter, it hardly seems likely that they would refuse to uphold the ban on Communist travel on the premise that it
constitutes a bill of attainder.

118 Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U. S. 127
(1947); United States Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947).
Mr.
119 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N. E. 517 (1892).
Justice Holmes said in upholding the dismissal of petitioner from his job for
soliciting money for political purposes in violation of the regulations of his
employment: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." Id. 29 N. E. at 517.
120 See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 (D. C. Cir.), cert. granted, 339
U. S. 977 (1950) (upholding Presidential Loyalty Order) ; Lederman v. Board
of Education, 276 App. Div. 527, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 466 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 301
N. Y. 476 (1950) (upheld statute banning membership in certain organizations
as a condition for employment in the public school system).
'121 INT.RNAL SECURITY Act § 6(a).
122 SoloW, Stalins American Passport Mill, 47 AmRICAN MERCURY 187, 302
(July 1939).
123 Rex v. Brailsford, [1905] 2 K. B. 730, 745.
12440 STAT. 559 (1918), as amended, 55 STAT. 252-3 (1941), 22 U. S. C.
§223-6 (1946).
12 United States ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F. 2d 288 (2d Cir. 1927).
126 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325 (1939).
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VII
Immigration
A sovereign power has the right to exclude citizens of other
nations from its borders. 127 This prerogative has been statutorily
implemented in the United States for the purpose of excluding anarchists, those who advocated forceful overthrow of government, or
28
those who belonged to organizations which advocated the same.1
The Internal Security Act has for its purpose the extension of the
provisions excluding certain types of aliens.' 29 In effectuating its
purpose it excludes those aliens who seek entry to engage in activities
prejudicial to the public interest, 3 0 and those aliens who, it is reasonable to believe, will engage in activities in opposition to the form
of government established in the United States or who will join organizations required to register under other provisions of the Act. 131
These prospective provisions do not exhaust the coverage of the
Act. It is further provided that "aliens who at any time shall be
or shall have been members" of or affiliated with any totalitarian
party are to be barred from entry.' 32 Hence it is possible to exclude
an alien on the mere basis of his past affiliations no matter what his
current sentiments might be.
The Justice Department, having supervision of alien immigration '3 and guided by the Act's mandate that no person may be admitted who is made inadmissible by the provisions of the Act, 134 has
given a literal construction to the exclusionary provisions in some
cases.' 3 5 This limitation placed on the executive discretion might well
have ironic consequences in that fugitives from a totalitarianism that
they have renounced may be technically excluded by reason of their
past affiliations. The limitation has already produced some clash between the executive and the legislature. 3 6 Further, the broad ban
United States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U. S. 279 (1932).
as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 137 (1946). The denial
of admission to an alien anarchist is not a violation of a constitutional right.
United States v. Parson, 22 F. Supp. 149 (S. D. Cal. 1938).
129 INTERNAL SECURITY ACT § 22.
This section largely rewrites the Act of
October 16, 1918, 40 STAT. 1012, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 137 (1946). Since
Section 22 causes a direct amendment it will be cited hereafter as 40 STAT.
1012 (1918), as amended, 8 U. S. C. A. § 137 (Supp. 1950).
.130 Id. § 1(1). The phrase "prejudicial to the public interest" is quite likely
adopted from a refusal to allow entry to any alien if it "would be prejudicial
to the interests of the United States" contained in the Presidential Proclamation No. 2523 of November 14, 1941, issued pursuant to 22 U. S. C. § 223.
This provision was upheld in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537 (1950).
13140 STAT. 1012 (1918), as amended, 8 U. S. C. A. § 137(3) (Supp. 1950).
3
1 2 I. (2).
13332 STAT. 828 (1903), as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 131 (1946).
13440 STAT. 1012 (1918), as amended, 8 U. S. C. A. § 137 (Supp. 1950).
135 See N. Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1950, p. 5, col. 3; N. Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1950,
p. 1, col. 1.
136 See N. Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1951, p. 34, col. 3, wherein is reported Attorney
127

12840 STAT. 1012 (1918),
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on former
members of totalitarian parties has met with international
137
reaction.
Although the United States has, as a sovereign, absolute power to
exclude an alien upon any condition,13 8 it would seem that the conditions contained in the Internal Security Act are productive of much
domestic and international ill-will. Perhaps it would be wiser for
Congress to allow the Justice Department a wider discretion in this
matter, or at least clarify its intent so as to remove the many thorny
issues that have arisen. 8 9
VIII
Naturalization Provisions
The Internal Security Act undertakes to enlarge the class of
persons who may be denied the privilege of becoming naturalized
citizens of the United States.140 Related to these new regulations is
a provision which seeks to make easier the government's task of revoking the citizenship of certain people. Any person who within
five years of his naturalization (if it was after January 1, 1951) joins
a Communist organization shall be deemed prima facie not to have
been attached to the principles of the Constitution at the time of his
naturalization. 141 Unless this prima facie evidence is successfully
rebutted the citizen's "papers" may be revoked on the ground of
fraud.
There is statutory authorization for revocation of citizenship obtained through fraud.' 42 Non-attachment to the principles of the
Constitution at the time of naturalization is such a fraud. 143 Often
the fraudulent state of mind of a citizen at the time of his naturalization must be proved by his subsequent conduct. 144 However,
since
45
the courts are not very receptive to this type of evidence,1 it must
be "clear, unequivocal, and convincing." ' 46 The acts and statements
General McGrath's defense of the Justice Department's implementation of the
exclusionary provisions of Section 22.
137 N. Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1951, p. 5, col. 4, wherein it is reported that Spain
has criticized the exclusion of its citizens.
'13 Nicoli v. Briggs, 83 F. 2d 375 (10th Cir. 1936).
139 President Truman has already signed an amendment to Section 22 excluding from its coverage those who became members of Nazi, Fascist, or
Communist organizations before they were sixteen years old, and those who
became members of such organizations for purposes of obtaining employment,
food rations, and other essentials of life. N. Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1951, p. 25,

col. 1.
140 Section 25 of the Internal Security Act amends Section 305 of the
Nationality Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 1141 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 705 (1946).
14154 STAT. 1141 (1940), as amended, 8 U. S. C. A. § 705 (d) (Supp. 1950).
14254 STAT. 1158 (1940), as amended, S U. S. C. §738 (1946).
143 United States v. Swelgin, 254 Fed. 844 (D. C. Ore. 1918).
144 United States v. Wilmovski, 56 F. Supp. 63 (N. D. Ind. 1943).
145 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665 (1944).
140 Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 (1946).
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of a citizen subsequent to his naturalization indicating his continued
loyalty to his native country have47 been found sufficient to meet the
high standard of proof required.
The courts have upheld a statute similar to the one under review
in the case of Luria v. United States.148 There a statute provided
that the establishment of a permanent foreign residence by a naturalized citizen within five years of his naturalization was to be deemed
prima facie evidence of his fraudulent state of mind. The Court
emphasized the fact that the statute merely pronounced a rule of evidence and did not establish substantive rights. The presumption
raised by the statute could be easily rebutted by showing that the
reason for establishing a permanent foreign residence was not inconsistent with an honest desire to be a bona fide American citizen. 14
Of course, by such a procedure the burden is thrown on the citizen
to show that his state of mind was honest at the time he accepted
citizenship. But this does not seem unwarrantable, especially when
it is considered that a petitioner for American citizenship must initially assert his adherence to the Constitution.' "°
It would seem that where the naturalized citizen is given opportunity to rebut the presumption by proof that his subsequent membership in a Communist organization does not negate his possession
at the time of his naturalization of a well disposed attitude toward
constitutional principles, no right in him is invaded.
No effort has been made to discuss the wisdom behind the enactment of the Internal'Security Act. Perhaps time is the only true
judge of its merit. But whether the Congress was wise or not, it
has sown a fertile field for constitutional questions. Many such
questions have been argued in Congressional debate, in legal and
political periodicals, in newspapers and magazines, and in everyday
topical discussion. Of course, no conclusive results have been derived from these polemics, mainly for the reason that they are necessarily cast in the abstract.
A final resolution of the problems inherent in the legislation
must be found in the courts, where the advantages will be had of
applying the statute to a particular factual situation. Then when
the issue is properly raised the court can decide whether the statute
applies and if it does, whether it meets the test of constitutionality.

147

United States v. Kramer, 262 Fed. 395 (5th Cir. 1919).

14s231

U. S. 9 (1913).

149 United States
150 54 STAT. 1157

v. Patterson, 4 F. Supp. 693 (D. C. Mont. 1933).
(1940), as amended, 8 U. S. C. A. § 735 (Supp. 1950).

